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ABSTRACT: The Medicare Shared Savings Program, a component of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, has accelerated the creation of accountable care organizations (ACOs), 
payer–provider alliances meant to deliver lower-cost but still high-quality health care via new 
payment models, particularly ones that reward efficiency. This paper describes and reports on the 
implementation of eight private ACOs that use, or are planning to deploy, a shared payer–
provider risk payment model. Still in an early developmental phase, these payment models vary 
not only in their design and in how they define shared risk. The authors note that providers 
currently lack the infrastructure required to take on and manage risk successfully, though some 
payers are providing such support. Providers will need more data and analytic capabilities to 
manage the patient populations for which they take on financial risk and to negotiate appropriate 
risk-sharing arrangements with payers. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is serving as a catalyst in health 
care for new approaches to measuring performance and value, promoting wider adoption 
of health information technology (HIT), and developing models for delivering and paying 
for care more effectively and efficiently. In particular, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program created by the legislation establishes financial incentives for accountable care 
organizations (ACOs) to provide coordinated, well-integrated care. Anticipation of the 
program has caused a flurry of activity among providers, purchasers, and payers. 
 
Providers and payers recognize that for ACOs to reach their potential, there is a 
need for payment models other than the fee-for-service approach dominant today. As the 
new ACOs form, payers are establishing shared-savings programs and other payment 
models in an effort to create financial incentives for high-quality care. Payers are also 
considering payment methods that confer a portion of the financial risk to the provider, 
seeking to create stronger incentives than shared savings only; in fact, the proposed rule 
for the Shared Savings Program includes a shared-risk component. But while many 
providers and payers prepare to participate in ACOs, there is minimal evidence about 
what it takes for ACOs to succeed, including the payment models—shared-risk or 
otherwise—that will most appropriately support them. 
 
This report summarizes research on ACO shared-risk payment models conducted 
by Catalyst for Payment Reform and Booz Allen Hamilton. The focus is on private sector 
payment models that meet criteria along three dimensions: provider risk, inclusion of 
services, and incentives for quality. Models of interest are those that include a provider 
risk-sharing component, address the broad array or full continuum of patient 
care/services, and provide meaningful quality incentives. While we found dozens of ACO 
initiatives, only eight met the criteria for inclusion in this study. 
 
The research uncovered several key findings: 
 
• Payer–provider shared-risk models are in an early developmental phase; there are few 
operational shared-risk models aside from the traditional capitated HMO model. 
• There are varying definitions of shared risk, and shared-risk initiatives use a variety 
of program designs. 
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• Providers do not currently have the infrastructure required to take on and manage  
risk successfully, though some payers are providing infrastructure and other support 
to providers. 
• Shared-risk models have typically evolved from shared-savings programs. 
 
It is particularly important to note the very early stage of development of these 
population-based, shared-risk contracts. We found few operational shared-risk payment 
models; most are in development or at an early stage of implementation. Of those that are 
operational, many launched only in the first quarter of 2011 (three of the eight models). A 
variety of approaches to shared risk exist. Exhibit ES-1 summarizes the four main 
approaches we found. 
 
Exhibit ES-1. Shared Risk Payment: Four Approaches 
Risk Model Definition Examples 
Bonus Payment at 
Risk 
Provider is at risk of not receiving a bonus 
payment based on quality and/or 
efficiency performance 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Minnesota 
Preferred One 
Market Share Risk Patients are incentivized by lower copays 
or premiums to select certain providers so 
providers are at risk of loss of market 
share 
Buyers Health Care Action 
Group  
Risk of Baseline 
Revenue Loss 
Built on a fee-for-service “chassis”; 
providers face a financial or payment loss 
if they fail to meet certain cost or quality 
thresholds, and/or if actual costs exceed a 
target cost 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts AQC 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Illinois–Advocate Health 
Care 
Financial Risk for 
Patient Population 
(Whole or Partial) 
Providers manage patient treatment costs 
for all or a designated set of services 
within a predetermined payment stream 
and are at risk for costs that exceed 
payments (e.g., partial/full capitation, 
global budget) 
State Employees Health 
Commission (State of 
Maine) (planned) 
Anthem/WellPoint 
(planned) 
 
While this work focused on shared-risk models that fall into the definitions in the 
bottom two rows of this table, it is the models in which providers take on whole or partial 
financial risk for a patient population—and move away from the fee-for-service 
“chassis”— that are arguably of greatest interest. All of the studied models include the 
fee-for-service “chassis”; we were unable to find any models currently in place that both 
move away from fee-for-service and include financial risk to the provider for a patient 
population. 
 
The fact that providers lack the infrastructure they need to take on and manage 
risk successfully was also a common theme among the initiatives we studied. Providers 
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do not have the data they need about the clinical or financial experience of their patients 
to manage patient care and financial risk effectively—the HIT structure necessary to 
coordinate care among providers is at varying levels of implementation. Providers also 
face operational and structural challenges related to the ACO model of care, which 
demand more coordinated, efficient processes. Many of the initiatives we studied try to 
mitigate some of these challenges by providing case management, disease management, 
and risk management support to providers. 
 
Although this research uncovered several key findings about the development of 
ACOs and the payment models to support them, it is too early to identify which payment 
models best align incentives for ACOs with high-quality, high-value care. The majority 
of the payment models we studied have a fee-for-service foundation; however, shared 
risk combined with other base payment approaches can be even more robust. Capitation, 
bundled payments, and global budgets place the responsibility for managing financial risk 
more squarely on the shoulders of providers. Though we did not uncover any existing 
initiatives that employ one of these payment methods and meet the other research criteria, 
some initiatives anticipate more aggressive shared-risk payment models in their future. 
These burgeoning models and the experiments they embody will inevitably instruct us. 
 
While many unknowns remain, this research advances our collective 
understanding and identifies several elements of ACO development to monitor and learn 
from over time. Through the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, there might 
even be opportunities to build on these experiments with public–private partnerships, 
strengthening the power of the pilots and making it potentially easier to detect their 
impact. Alignment between Medicare and the private sector will be critical to strengthen 
the impact of each other’s reforms, sending consistent signals to and intensifying 
incentives for health care providers to improve quality and reduce costs. It is also critical 
to assure that Medicare reforms do not simply lead providers to shift additional costs 
from Medicare to private purchasers and payers but, instead, make health care more 
affordable for all. It is unlikely that there will ultimately be a “one size fits all” solution; 
it will be important to learn which models work best in which situations. 
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PROMISING PAYMENT REFORM: RISK-SHARING  
WITH ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy Context 
The need for innovation in the U.S. health care system continues to accelerate as costs 
stay on their upward trajectory while quality remains stagnant. The March 2010 passage 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act has been a catalyst for change, 
producing innovations in the measurement of performance and value as well as payment 
and care delivery models, and increasing the use of health information technology (IT). 
The payment and care delivery reforms of the Affordable Care Act provide the impetus 
for providers and payers to move the U.S. health care system beyond the predominant, 
yet fragmented, fee-for-service (FFS) approach to payment and powerful momentum for 
private sector purchasers to make their own reforms. Alignment between Medicare and 
the private sector will be critical to strengthen the impact of each other’s reforms, sending 
consistent signals to and intensifying incentives for health care providers to improve 
quality and reduce costs. It is critical to assure that Medicare reforms do not simply lead 
providers to shift additional costs from Medicare to private purchasers and payers but, 
instead, make health care more affordable for all. 
 
One reform initiated by the Affordable Care Act that has created a significant 
amount of interest and activity is the establishment of a Medicare shared savings payment 
model for providers that are participating in accountable care organizations (ACOs). 
While the specifics of organizational structure and defining characteristics of ACOs will 
continue to evolve as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) moves from the 
proposed rule to the final rule for the Shared Savings Program, the broad definition of an 
ACO is a group of providers that work together to provide and coordinate care for a 
specified patient population. The provider members of the ACO collectively take 
accountability for providing and coordinating care for their patients across the care 
continuum.1 Accountable care organizations promise better-coordinated care (and, 
therefore, higher-quality and more efficient care at a lower cost), fostered through 
concerted collaboration among providers. CMS has established a series of associated 
programs within the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to foster and support 
the development of ACOs. 
                                                
1 Definition of ACO adapted from CMS’s Proposed Rule on the Medicare Shared Savings Program: 
Accountable Care Organizations, released March 31, 2011. 
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To realize their full potential, ACOs will require other reimbursement models 
than the traditional FFS common today, so the private sector has been investigating 
payment models to meet this need. Many of the models being implemented or developed 
for ACOs in the private sector are similar to the planned Medicare initiative in their use 
of a shared savings approach.2 While shared savings helps create incentives for efficiency 
and quality, other payment models are being explored that may create even stronger 
incentives. Such alternative models involve shared risk whereby ACOs share in some of 
the losses when costs or spending exceed an established target. 
 
Research Scope and Understanding of Payment Models 
An understanding of emerging private sector shared-risk ACO payment models, whether 
currently operational or in development, will be beneficial as CMS and the private sector 
contemplate ACO payment models beyond the Medicare Shared Savings Program.3 
Using a grant from The Commonwealth Fund, Catalyst for Payment Reform teamed with 
Booz Allen Hamilton to identify innovative ACO payment models and to use this report 
to present findings related to each model. 
 
The primary objective of the research was to identify commercial insurers or 
payers with ACO payment models that met criteria along three dimensions: provider risk, 
inclusion of services, and incentives for quality. Models of interest were those that 
include a provider risk-sharing component, address the broad array or full continuum of 
patient care/services, and create meaningful quality incentives. The research focused on 
payment models that include both upside and downside risk; we defined shared risk for 
this effort as “payment models in which providers share in a portion of the savings they 
achieve (upside), but are also at risk for a portion of spending that exceeds a target 
(downside).” Shared risk within the providers’ payment structure was of specific interest, 
as opposed to, for example, market-share risk wherein poor performance may cause a 
provider a loss of market share. 
 
There are many existing payer–provider risk arrangements, but in most cases 
these payment models involve a narrow scope of services, and/or have no quality 
component, and/or are associated with Medicare Advantage or other traditional staff-
model HMOs; these were not the focus of this research. Exhibit 1 illustrates the spectrum 
                                                
2 The shared savings approach to ACO payment allows ACOs potentially to retain some portion of 
savings they are able to demonstrate over a specified time period; eligibility to retain some of the savings is 
often dependent on achieving specified quality targets. ACOs have an incentive not only to provide care 
efficiently in order to demonstrate savings but also to maintain quality. 
3 CMS’s Proposed Rule on ACOs indicates ACOs must include a shared risk model of payment by 
their third year of participation. 
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of payment models along the three dimensions of interest noted above; the pink shaded 
portion denotes the area in which this research focused. The payment models noted  
are examples across the respective spectrums shown and are not meant to be an 
exhaustive list. 
 
Exhibit 1. Dimensions of Interest 
 
This report is one of several projects funded by The Commonwealth Fund to 
document alternative payment models. Another project being conducted in parallel by 
Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC, will identify and document shared savings (upside only) 
programs in the public and private sectors. As we describe below, the two project teams 
collaborated in their respective work. 
 
The two following sections describe the approach we used for this study and key 
findings. Included are details on discussions with the representatives from the initiatives 
that met the research criteria, organized alphabetically by payer, with details on the 
initiative in both a summary table and narrative format. The development of shared-risk 
models is in its infancy and many models are still under development; these findings 
represent a snapshot in time. 
 
HOW THIS STUDY WAS CONDUCTED 
At the outset, the project team defined the criteria by which to assess payment initiatives 
for inclusion and the key elements of each initiative to explore through the research. 
Exhibit 2 illustrates how the criteria described above narrowed the universe of initiatives 
to be included in this work. To identify initiatives for potential inclusion, we first 
conducted informal interviews with subject matter experts from the provider and payer 
communities and from the broader public and private sector health care industry. In 
addition, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) and America’s Health 
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Insurance Plans helped us to understand activity among each organization’s member 
plans. The research turned up dozens of initiatives; 16 met the criteria for interviews.4 
 
The key elements of interest included general information about the initiative, 
such as provider, purchaser, and payer participants and respective market share; type of 
payment model including range of financial risk and performance-based revenue; 
performance metrics; and stage of implementation. The project team developed an 
interview guide (available from the authors on request) to serve as the framework for 60-
minute interviews. The guide aligns with the one used by Bailit Health Purchasing so as 
to gather, where possible, comparable information across the two projects. Catalyst for 
Payment Reform, Booz Allen Hamilton, The Commonwealth Fund, and BCBSA 
reviewed and provided input on the guide and the project team field-tested the guide 
internally before putting it to use. Two members of the project team conducted each 
interview, completing a total of 16 interviews. (See Appendix A for a list of organizations 
we interviewed.) 
 
On completion of the interviews, the project team reviewed the information 
gathered, confirmed which initiatives met the criteria for inclusion in the white paper, 
outlined the key findings or themes from the research, and designed a template for 
presenting succinct summary-level information about each risk-sharing payment model. 
We present the results of this synthesis in the following sections. 
                                                
4 Initiatives identified for research may not reflect a comprehensive list due to limitations on the 
project timeline and/or willingness of identified initiatives to participate in the study; additional risk-
sharing payment models may exist. 
Exhibit 2. Criteria for Initiatives Included in This Report 
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KEY FINDINGS 
Based on information from the 16 interviews, the project team identified eight initiatives 
that involve shared risk as defined above. Exhibit 3 presents the implementation status of 
the shared-risk payment models. The highlighted payers have existing arrangements with 
ACOs (or burgeoning ACOs), but for some the shared-risk components of some 
arrangements are still in development. More specific information about each initiative is 
in the section, Shared-Risk Payment Model Summaries. 
 
Exhibit 3. Payers with Existing Shared-Risk Payment Models  
or with Shared-Risk Payment Models in Development 
 
Payer Name 
Existing Shared-Risk 
Payment Model? 
Shared-Risk Payment 
Model in Development? 
Aetna (Nationwide)  X 
Anthem/WellPoint (California)   X 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of  
North Carolina  X 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois X  
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts X  
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield  
of New Jersey X  
Medica X  
State Employees Health Commission 
(State of Maine) X  
 
The following themes emerged based on initial research and information from  
the interviews: 
 
• Payer–provider shared-risk models are in an early developmental phase; there are few 
operational shared-risk models aside from the traditional capitated HMO model 
(excluded from this research). 
• There are varying definitions of shared risk, and shared-risk initiatives use a variety 
of program designs. 
• Providers do not currently have the infrastructure required to take on and manage risk 
successfully, though some payers are providing infrastructure and other support to 
providers. 
• Shared-risk models have typically evolved from shared-savings programs. 
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Payer–provider shared-risk models are in an early developmental phase; there are few 
operational risk-sharing models aside from the traditional HMO and capitation model. 
Through the initial research and subsequent interviews, the project team identified few 
operational shared-risk payment models; of the initiatives we identified, most are in early 
development stages. One interview revealed that only letters of agreement were in place 
and that the model will be launched in the near future; another has an initial agreement in 
place while a longer-term contract is under negotiation. Of those that are operational, 
many were only launched in the first quarter of 2011 (three of the eight models). The 
longest-standing shared-risk model involves Medica Health Plan, launched in 2008, 
followed by the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS MA) Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC), which launched in 2009. 
 
There are varying definitions of shared risk, and shared-risk initiatives use a variety of 
program designs. 
The term “shared risk” was interpreted in various ways by interviewees. Exhibit 4 
summarizes the definitions of shared risk we found during our research and interviews. 
 
Exhibit 4. Provider Risk Models 
Risk Model Definition Examples 
Bonus Payment at 
Risk 
Provider is at risk of not receiving a bonus 
payment based on quality and/or 
efficiency performance 
Blue Cross Blue Shield  
of Minnesota 
Preferred One 
Market Share Risk Patients are incentivized by lower copays 
or premiums to select certain providers so 
providers are at risk of loss of market 
share 
Buyers Health Care Action 
Group  
Risk of Baseline 
Revenue Loss 
Built on a fee-for-service “chassis”; 
providers face a financial or payment loss 
if they fail to meet certain cost or quality 
thresholds, and/or if actual costs exceed a 
target cost 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts AQC 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Illinois–Advocate Health 
Care 
Financial Risk for 
Patient Population 
(Whole or Partial) 
Providers manage patient treatment costs 
for all or a designated set of services 
within a predetermined payment stream 
and are at risk for costs that exceed 
payments (e.g., partial/full capitation, 
global budget) 
State Employees Health 
Commission (State of 
Maine) (planned) 
Anthem/WellPoint 
(planned) 
 
This study focused on shared-risk models that fall into the definitions in the 
bottom two rows of Exhibit 4: those that included the direct downside risk of potential 
baseline revenue loss or overall financial risk based on how well a patient population is 
treated and managed. Of these two types of risk models, we found only models that 
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include potential baseline revenue loss to be currently implemented; the models that 
include provider financial risk for a patient population were under development. 
 
The shared-risk models we researched vary in their program design. Five of the 
implemented models include risk of revenue loss based on quality and/or efficiency 
results; each of these five is implemented in a slightly different way. Four of the five 
models share a common design element in that they measure providers’ “savings” or 
“losses”; providers are at risk to lose some of their baseline revenue if they demonstrate a 
loss based on this measurement. However, both the method for measuring the loss (or 
savings) and the financial impact on the providers varies across the four initiatives. Two 
of the models measure loss (or savings) as actual cost experience compared against a 
prenegotiated target cost, one model assesses actual cost against the market average 
medical cost trend, and one model compares provider actual cost to costs of a peer group. 
The models also vary in how they implement the financial impact to providers. For 
example, the AQC model requires providers whose actual costs exceed the target or 
budgeted costs to reimburse BCBS MA some percentage of the loss; the Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey model has a similar reimbursement process. With the 
BCBS Illinois–Advocate model, however, the provider feels the financial impact in the 
future (i.e., if Advocate experiences a loss, it is subject to callbacks in unit pricing for the 
following year). In two of the models, providers prospectively set aside funds to be “at 
risk”; the providers earn back or lose some or all of these funds based on their attainment 
of quality and efficiency metrics. None of the models disclosed the amount of revenue at 
risk, thus it is not possible to compare the revenue at risk across models. 
 
Providers do not have the infrastructure required to take on and manage risk 
successfully, though some payers are providing infrastructure and other support  
to providers. 
Across all initiatives, interviewees discussed the infrastructure providers need to take on 
and manage risk successfully. Interviewees frequently mentioned the need for data, the 
analytic power to turn those data into actionable information, and the need for robust 
health IT infrastructure. Currently, providers do not have sufficient data about the clinical 
or financial experience of their patients; these data are important to manage patient care 
and financial risk effectively as well as to support rapid-cycle performance evaluation 
and targeted improvement efforts. Many of the initiatives we interviewed include some 
level of provider quality and/or efficiency data feedback to providers, and many offer 
frequent sharing of utilization and cost information so providers can correct course on a 
near real-time basis. However, to participate in the design of appropriate risk 
arrangements—and to manage risk effectively—providers require these and other data as 
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well as analytic and modeling capabilities. Some interviewees noted that many providers 
are at a disadvantage in negotiating and managing shared-risk arrangements because of 
their lack of experience in understanding the overall financial risk of their populations 
and actuarial modeling to support negotiating and managing shared-risk contracts. There 
may be a role for other entities, including payers, in helping providers meet these needs. 
Without such support, providers may enter into contracts that are not sustainable. 
 
In addition, interviewees noted the importance of interoperable health IT across 
participants in ACOs, but they reported varying levels of health IT preparedness among 
provider groups. Some interviewees highlighted the development of IT infrastructure as 
an area of focus for support to providers. This IT infrastructure will be important to 
support clinical functions across providers (e.g., to support care coordination and care 
transitions; to provide screening reminders and wellness communication to patients). In 
addition, an IT infrastructure that better integrates financial and clinical systems—such as 
through interoperability with external data sources (e.g., payers, ancillary services)—will 
further enhance ACO efficiency and effectiveness in managing care delivery and 
financial risk. 
 
Providers are also faced with operational and structural challenges related to the 
ACO model of care, which demands more coordinated, efficient processes. Some 
provider groups are more prepared for coordinated care delivery than others. Many 
interviewees discussed the tools and resources they are making available to support 
providers in some of these challenges, including case management, disease management, 
and risk management. See the “Provider Support” section of each model’s summary table 
in the Shared-Risk Payment Model Summaries section for specifics about the various 
ways payers are supporting provider groups in the eight highlighted models. 
 
Shared-risk models have typically evolved from shared-savings programs. 
Instances of payment models evolving (or intending to evolve) from a shared-savings-
only model to include shared risk are common among interviewees. For example, 
Anthem/WellPoint plans to make this transition over a three- to five-year period under 
the notion that there must also be downside risk for a payment model to create incentives 
to improve cost and quality. Additionally, Aetna foresees expanding its shared savings 
models to include more shared risk or some level of capitated provider payment in the 
future, depending on the providers’ willingness to accept this type of risk and their 
patient case mix. In their collaboration, the Maine State Employees Health Commission 
and MaineGeneral Health also anticipate using shared savings as a stepping stone to 
broader shared-risk arrangements. Although in many of these models shared savings are 
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intended to be a stepping stone to shared risk, the result may reflect a bias in the sample 
as the interviews focused on shared-risk models. The research on shared-savings models 
conducted by Bailit Health Purchasing provides an additional perspective on how payers 
view shared savings initiatives within their overall payment strategy. 
 
SHARED-RISK PAYMENT MODEL SUMMARIES 
The following eight initiatives used a payment model that aligned with the research 
criteria and definition of shared risk. 
 
1. Aetna 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
Through development and implementation of ACO models, Aetna primarily seeks to 
create value for its various stakeholders—members, providers, and purchasers—by 
aligning incentives to help reduce medical costs and improve quality and care outcomes. 
It describes its approach as “holistic,” including not only payment redesign but also 
supporting providers with care management and other decision-support systems. Recent 
health reform legislation has also motivated Aetna to develop innovative care delivery 
and payment models. Aetna is developing a variety of ACO models in collaboration with 
health systems throughout the country and customizes its approach to payment, 
performance measurement, or provider support for all of these ACO partnerships. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
A variety of providers are participating or planning to participate in Aetna’s ACO 
models, including independent physician associations, multispecialty physician groups, 
and multispecialty physician groups with a contracted hospital(s). According to Aetna, 
factors that motivate providers to participate include improved care coordination through 
clinical integration technology, and a realization that change is needed to improve 
outcomes, reduce waste, and increase efficiencies with care delivery. 
 
With some of its ACO initiatives, Aetna members have the opportunity to choose 
an ACO-based product (as opposed to an open network PPO product, for example), 
which prospectively attributes them to the ACO and its participating providers. In other 
cases, where an ACO is affiliated with a PPO, for example, members are retrospectively 
attributed to the ACO based on utilization history or claims data. In this type of model, 
patients are not locked in to receiving care from the ACO. However, if members seek 
care outside of the ACO, or if there is evidence of a significant lack of care management, 
there may be an impact on providers’ payment under the shared-savings model. 
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Aetna at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Aetna 
Provider Participation • Implementing ACO initiatives and payment models with 
multiple health systems 
• Collaborating with health systems throughout the country to 
design and implement additional ACO models 
Status as of May 2011 Three ACOs launched in early 2011 
Geographic Reach Existing models: one in the Midwest, one in the West, and one in 
the Southeast (unable to provide specific geographic/market 
information) 
Market Share Unable to provide  
Products Unable to provide 
Payment 
Payment Summary Varies by health system 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility 
Varies by health system and currently includes FFS with bundled 
payments for some services, and shared savings models; may 
broaden risk with some level of capitation in the future 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Varies by health system 
Efficiency  Varies by health system. Examples include measuring hospital 
admissions that could have been avoided, and potentially 
avoidable ER visits 
Implementation 
Provider Support Types of support vary by health system, and include care 
management/case management support and tools, provision of 
data on efficiency and quality, and other consultative services to 
support health systems achieving quality and efficiency goals 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
Aetna’s ACO models involve an array of payment arrangements including FFS, bundled 
payment, and shared savings; Aetna aims to implement increased provider risk with some 
level of capitation for ACOs in the future. The ability to implement shared-risk models 
will depend on the provider’s patient population and desire to assume such risk. 
 
The shared-savings models are based on efficiency metrics, whereby providers 
are eligible for up to half of the total amount saved; providers earn a share of these 
savings based on their performance on quality metrics. 
 
Performance Measurement 
In Aetna’s shared-savings models, providers are eligible for a portion of the savings if 
they meet efficiency thresholds related to (for example) avoidable inpatient admissions 
and ER visits. Once providers achieve these efficiency thresholds, they must meet a set of 
clinical quality measure benchmarks to receive any of the savings. 
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In efforts to assist providers with improving their performance over time, Aetna 
provides data feedback and support tools to educate them about specific areas of care. 
Aetna also promotes case management services to ensure improved outcomes. On a 
quarterly basis, Aetna assesses data on efficiency results, while they assess data on 
clinical measures semiannually. 
 
Looking Ahead 
Aetna recognizes it is increasingly important to engage the provider community and 
facilitate discussions for health system improvement. As it begins a journey down this 
alternative path, Aetna intends to support ACOs actively to ensure a collaborative 
partnership to accomplish the Triple Aim. 
 
2. Anthem/WellPoint 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
Anthem/WellPoint and the participating provider organizations initiated the ACO payment 
model jointly, agreeing that a change in the current reimbursement system was necessary 
to promote the goals of higher quality and reduced cost. Providers, it was determined, had 
to have more “skin in the game” and accountability with respect to the costs and quality 
of care. Quality and efficiency metrics will be used to ensure that providers do not 
achieve savings by rationing care. Depending on the success of the ACO pilots, the 
relationships and payment model may expand both in duration and geographic reach. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
To participate in an Anthem/WellPoint ACO arrangement, a provider group should serve 
an attributed population of 15,000 PPO members, offer the full complement of medical 
services (with the exception of transplants), have demonstrated a plan for reducing the 
cost of medical care, have an IT platform for the capture and electronic exchange of 
clinical information, be financially stable, and have a formal legal structure and 
commitment from its leadership. The provider group must also be willing to enter a five-
year contractual relationship. 
 
Patients are attributed to the ACO by looking at two years of retrospective claims 
data; however, once a patient is attributed to an ACO, s/he is considered part of that ACO 
for the following year. The four participants in the Anthem/WellPoint pilot requested a 
50 percent threshold for a patient to be attributed to the ACO—patients who receive 50 
percent or more of their care with a given provider (based on two years of claims data) 
are attributed to that provider’s ACO. Once attributed, a patient is considered to be in that 
ACO for a year; therefore, the attribution can be considered prospective. Although 
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patients are in the ACO for a year, they are not locked in to seeing only providers within 
the ACO and providers can refer patients outside of the ACO. However, if patients seek 
care outside of the ACO, the ACO is still accountable for their care and costs. 
Anthem/WellPoint performs the attribution every six months for new additions to the 
membership and deletions every two weeks for members who lose Anthem/WellPoint 
coverage, select another Anthem/WellPoint product, such as the HMO, or move to a 
geographic location not covered by the ACO. 
 
Anthem/WellPoint communicates with its members, employers, and brokers an 
overview of the ACO model of care, emphasizing also that benefits have not changed. 
Communications also indicate that, in the future, members may be incentivized to enroll 
in this ACO as a type of insurance product. 
 
Anthem/WellPoint at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Anthem/WellPoint 
Provider Participation • Monarch—IPA 
• Health Partners—IPA 
• Sharp Reese—IHS 
• Sharp Community Medical Group—IHS  
Status as of May 2011 • Three of the models launched in January 2011 under five-year 
shared savings contracts, and the fourth model’s contract is in-
process 
• Contracts will implement shared risk in three to five years 
Geographic Reach Pilots are located in Orange County, Los Angeles County, and 
San Diego County, California 
Market Share Information not provided; varies by market 
Products Commercial PPO 
Payment 
Payment Summary FFS with shared savings based on actual costs compared to a 
medical cost target; intent is to evolve to a global budget with 
shared risk 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility 
In addition to FFS, the ACOs are eligible for up to 50 percent of 
any savings they achieve if they meet a quality gate (threshold). 
Their performance on efficiency metrics provides the basis for the 
amount of their shared savings payment 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care with the exception of transplants 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Acute care processes and outcomes; chronic care processes and 
outcomes; patient safety; patient experience; includes both 
physician and hospital metrics 
Efficiency  Costs are estimated by service utilization rates (e.g., Spine MRIs 
per 1,000) 
Implementation 
Provider Support Plan engages in robust data exchange with providers and 
produces reports on providers’ performance against benchmarks. 
The reporting and data exchange frequency varies from monthly 
to annually 
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Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
The ACOs are paid on a FFS basis with the potential for a share of savings based on 
performance against a medical cost target. If savings are achieved, the upside for 
providers is to receive a share of those savings; to share in savings, the ACO must pass a 
“quality gate” based on clinical quality measures. If the ACO meets the minimum quality 
threshold, it is eligible for up to 50 percent of the savings generated. The amount received 
(up to 50 percent of the total savings) depends on performance on efficiency measures. 
 
Caps on high-cost cases are part of the contract discussion with each ACO, and 
most ACOs carry reinsurance (stop-loss insurance). The goal is to evolve to a global 
budget in the future. Most provider groups are interested in moving to a global risk 
arrangement that would include risk corridors for both the upside and downside. 
 
Performance Measurement 
Anthem/WellPoint measures both clinical quality and efficiency at participating ACOs. 
More specifically, the providers must pass a quality gate or minimum performance 
threshold on clinical measures specific to physician care (e.g., breast cancer screening 
and nephropathy monitoring) and hospital care (e.g., the Joint Commission’s AMI, 
pneumonia, cardiac heart failure, and Surgical Care Improvement Project [SCIP] 
measures). The quality gate threshold and benchmarks are currently being established. 
Once the ACOs meet the quality gate threshold, they must meet certain efficiency criteria 
to receive a percentage of the savings for which they are eligible. Such efficiency metrics 
include avoidable emergency department visits per 1,000; prescriptions per 1,000 and 
generic prescribing rate; imaging (spine MRIs per 1,000); and inpatient admissions per 
1,000 and all-cause readmissions. 
 
Defining Success 
Anthem/WellPoint believes the success of an ACO depends on robust data exchanges, 
which allow providers to have better data to improve the quality and reduce costs of the 
defined population. With this model, the financial risk or incentives will aim to promote 
high-quality, coordinated care. Anthem/WellPoint is using local control groups to 
understand how quality and efficiency of care within the ACOs compare to that being 
provided elsewhere in the market. Anthem/WellPoint will also examine success at the 
enterprise level and employ criteria other than financial ones. 
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3. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
The arrangement between Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (BCBS IL) and Advocate 
Health Care (Advocate) was spurred by the ACO provisions of the Affordable Care Act. 
BCBS IL and Advocate had a previously established information exchange, so the 
transition to managing Advocate’s attributed PPO population was described as 
“straightforward.” Currently, the arrangement is overlaid on a broad PPO design. 
However, it is anticipated that a product may eventually be made out of the arrangement, 
once the final ACO regulations are released. 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois 
Provider Participation Advocate Health Care, encompassing 10 hospitals and 2,700 
physicians across all specialties 
Status as of May 2011 Agreement was signed in October 2010, and the three-year 
contract period began in January 2011 
Geographic Reach Greater Chicago area 
Market Share Advocate is the largest health system in Illinois and represents 
approximately 20 percent of the market 
Products Commercial PPO 
Payment 
Payment Summary Baseline payment is FFS; includes an upside risk in the form of 
shared savings and a downside risk in the form of potentially 
lower unit pricing in the future 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility 
If Advocate’s actual costs are lower than the risk-adjusted 
average medical cost trend, it is eligible for a percentage of the 
difference; if costs are higher than the average medical cost 
trend, it may face lower unit pricing in out years. In addition, 
Advocate may be penalized financially for declines in 
performance metrics 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care  
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Preventive care; acute care processes and outcomes; patient 
safety; patient experience 
Efficiency  Utilization is compared to medical cost trends 
Implementation 
Provider Support Support is provided on a monthly basis and includes 
performance feedback on HEDIS measures and costs/spending, 
and patient attribution updates 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
The arrangement encompasses the entire Advocate health system, which includes 
approximately 10 hospitals and 2,700 physicians across all specialties. Advocate is the 
largest health system in the state of Illinois, and includes nine of 10 hospitals in Chicago. 
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The patients participating in the model are all commercial PPO members, but they 
have not been formally notified of their participation. BCBS IL describes the patient 
attribution as “prospective based on retrospective utilization.” The threshold for 
attribution to Advocate is approximately 50 percent and is based on claims data from the 
previous two years. There is no patient lock-in—patients are free to receive care from any 
provider or health system (within their current benefit design). However, Advocate is 
ultimately responsible for the care of all its attributed patients, even if these patients elect 
to receive their care elsewhere. 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
Advocate is paid FFS and has the opportunity for shared savings (upside risk) and the 
potential for reduced unit pricing in the future (downside risk) based on performance 
against specific quality, safety, and patient satisfaction measures. To determine if savings 
are achieved, BCBS IL compares Advocate’s medical costs to the network average. The 
comparative measures are risk-adjusted, so patient costs are not truncated. If Advocate 
provides high-quality care at a lower threshold cost than the aggregate (minus Advocate) 
medical cost trend, it shares in the total amount of savings generated. If Advocate’s costs 
are higher than the threshold, BCBS IL will call back future unit pricing. Advocate is a 
fully integrated system, so the risk and savings are allocated at a system level. Advocate 
is responsible for managing the risk and distributing savings among the providers. BCBS 
IL conducts final payment reconciliation annually once the savings or losses have been 
evaluated. 
 
The arrangement also includes additional risk-sharing: Advocate is at risk for 
significant payment reductions if patient quality, safety, and satisfaction metrics decline; 
and BCBS IL is subject to financial penalties if it fails to provide timely data on 
performance and cost to Advocate. 
 
Performance Measurement 
Advocate’s payment from BCBS IL is partially determined by Advocate’s performance 
on patient quality, patient satisfaction, and efficiency metrics. These metrics include 
some HEDIS measures, as well as numerous other domains including never events, 
readmissions, ambulatory care, hospital-acquired infections, avoidable hospital days, 
appropriateness of advanced imaging utilization, and patient access to outpatient visits. 
 
Across these domains, Advocate must maintain a baseline in the first year of the 
agreement. To participate in shared savings (and avoid reduced unit pricing in the future), 
Advocate must demonstrate improvement during the second and third years. Under the 
contract, BCBS IL must evaluate Advocate’s performance on the HEDIS measures and 
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report their patient attribution and cost of care on a monthly basis. This information 
allows Advocate to monitor its progress and remain in contact with its attributed 
members as to better coordinate patient care. 
 
4. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
The Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) was the result of Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts’ (BCBS MA) 10-year vision (beginning in 2006) to “cross the quality 
chasm.” The two aims of the AQC are to reduce medical spending growth and improve 
quality of care and patient outcomes. BCBS MA established the AQC as an alternative 
(as opposed to mandatory) model of payment for provider organizations. While BCBS 
MA did not necessarily conceive it as a pilot, the AQC was tested on a smaller scale in 
the beginning with expectations that only 15 percent of contracted providers would 
participate. By end of year one, 23 percent of the contracted providers were involved. 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
Provider Participation Multispecialty groups, IPAs, PHOs, integrated systems 
Status as of May 2011 Launched in January 2009 
Geographic Reach Massachusetts, statewide 
Market Share 44 percent of commercial product business  
Products Commercial HMO and POS 
Payment 
Payment Summary Global budget with upside and downside risk sharing (50% to 
100%), in addition to bonus PMPM incentives for improved 
quality 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility  
BCBS MA allocates provider groups an annual budget (risk-
adjusted) with a payment differential based on surplus or deficit; 
BCBS MA will also pay groups a PMPM bonus if they meet 
certain quality thresholds on ambulatory and inpatient quality 
measures 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care  
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Ambulatory: chronic care process and outcomes; acute and 
preventive care process; patient experience. Hospital: acute and 
surgical care process and outcomes; patient experience 
Efficiency  Efficiency is measured by assessing actual costs against a 
negotiated annual budget 
Implementation 
Provider Support Types of support include: provision of data and information that 
inform provider groups about budget management and potential 
savings opportunities based on their performance on quality 
metrics; general best practices forums three times per year, as 
well as facilitation of user group dialogue related to more specific 
topics; consultative services that support provider groups and 
troubleshoot based on performance goals 
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Providers were eager to be a part of the AQC, acknowledging that payment 
reform was inevitable, and that it would be advantageous to participate in a payment 
reform initiative on a smaller scale before facing broader changes in payment and 
expectations regarding care delivery. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
Provider organizations participating in AQC include large multispecialty groups, 
independent practice associations (IPAs), or physician–hospital organizations (PHOs). To 
participate, the organization must collectively care for at least 5,000 members of BCBS 
MA’s commercial HMO or point-of-service product. Contract durations for each provider 
group span five years because of provider demand for more consistent payment levels 
over time and the need for sufficient time to develop necessary capacity and 
organizational structures to be successful within the model. 
 
Based on their selection of a primary care physician, BCBS MA prospectively 
assigns patients to an AQC-participating provider group. There is no formal process for 
notifying patients of whether their provider participates in the AQC. For patients that 
choose to seek care outside of the AQC provider arrangement, the AQC-contracted 
provider remains responsible for the patient’s care, including quality and costs associated 
with that care. 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
Providers participating in the AQC are paid FFS and have a prenegotiated per member 
per month (PMPM) budget. Providers are exposed to both an upside (in the form of a 
share in savings should costs be below budget) and downside risk (in the form of sharing 
in losses with BCBS MA should costs be higher than the budgeted amount). There is also 
a separate financial incentive based on quality of care. Currently, provider organizations 
may elect to take on between 50 percent and 100 percent risk; the aim of the AQC is to 
evolve to a standard of 80 percent risk across all providers. For those providers that 
assume risk between 50 percent and 100 percent, they share savings and losses with 
BCBS MA; providers that assume 100 percent risk keep all savings and are responsible 
for all losses. 
 
Each provider organization negotiates a baseline PMPM budget for the first year 
and annual budget changes for the remainder of the five-year contract period. Groups 
with high baseline budgets are typically given lower annual budget increases; budget 
trajectories over the five-year contract period are intended to reduce disparities between 
provider groups with higher or lower baseline rates. Providers must purchase reinsurance 
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so as to manage high-cost patients (e.g., when costs exceed $100,000). In some cases, an 
overall cost trend corridor allows the budgets of provider organizations to increase based 
on patient expenses. 
 
Provider organizations may also receive an incentive payment based on their 
performance on quality measures, independent of any share in savings or losses. The 
bonus system is based on absolute (as opposed to relative) performance, is the same for 
all groups for the contract period, and depends on an overall quality score that is created 
by aggregating quality scores from each measure. Currently, participating providers are 
eligible for up to 5 percent of their PMPM amount in incentive payments for ambulatory 
care measures and up to 5 percent PMPM for performance on inpatient care measures. 
 
Performance Measurement 
For provider organizations to qualify for the financial incentive payments, they must 
perform at a certain level on 32 ambulatory care and 32 inpatient care measures. There is 
a range of performance targets or “gates”; bonus payments vary based on the gate they 
achieve (i.e., by achieving gate 5, providers receive the full 5% bonus payment). Metrics 
include access, process, outcomes, and patient experience-of-care measures. 
 
Successes and Challenges to Date 
Since it introduced the AQC in January 2009, BCBS MA has improved its control of 
spending and quality. Participation in AQC has caused providers to reorient the way they 
provide care and engage patients, as seen, for example, through increased chronic care 
case management and home health visits. Some of the AQC’s successes may be 
attributable to the transparency of expectations and results with the contract, which 
enables providers to plan appropriately for care delivery. In addition, the AQC support 
team has been instrumental in engaging providers effectively and supporting them in 
improvement efforts. 
 
There have also been challenges with establishing and engaging certain providers 
in the AQC. For example, the existing national payment system continues to reward more 
care and more services without attention to quality or efficiency. Until we address this on 
a national scale, providers may prefer to continue with this payment model. Patients’ 
financial incentives in seeking care and level of awareness about costs are not well 
aligned with some of the newer payment models, which hold providers accountable for 
the patient’s care regardless of where patients seek care. Additionally, provider 
collaboration in the patient’s interest is a challenge, especially in cases where a physician 
group and a hospital are not joined by the same AQC arrangement and are not 
incentivized to collaborate for a given patient. 
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5. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
The Model Practice is currently being developed through collaborative discussions and 
funding from Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina (BCBS NC) and the University 
of North Carolina Health Care System (UNCHCS). Both BCBS NC and UNCHCS 
recognized an opportunity to work together in efforts to enhance health care quality, 
efficiency, and effectiveness, and ultimately to reduce health care costs. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
The Model Practice will be a small, primary care practice that will employ a full-time 
medical director in addition to a number of full-time primary care physicians, as well as 
additional providers ranging from physician assistants and nurse practitioners to 
nutritionists and mental health providers. The practice will have established relationships 
with specialists who will work with them consistently to enhance communication. The 
practice will also focus on coordination and communication among local hospitals and 
providers for transitional care. 
 
It is expected that the practice will serve approximately 5,000 adult patients with 
chronic conditions in the Research Triangle area, and will be available for all 
underwritten BCBS NC PPO members and a number of administrative-services-only 
(ASO) groups. BCBS NC plans to identify and incentivize patients with multiple chronic 
conditions to participate. One approach will be the implementation of voucher-type 
incentives to attract patients. Other incentives will involve the use of advanced 
technology to allow patients easier and better access to their physicians, medical records, 
and test results. 
 
While members will be free to select whether or not to visit the practice, they will 
be retrospectively attributed to it based on their record of visits over the course of the year. 
BCBS NC and UNCHCS are currently analyzing data to determine an attribution model. 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
During the development of the Model Practice, its costs will be borne by BCBS NC and 
UNCHCS equally. Once operational and caring for patients, the Model Practice will 
submit claims to BCBS NC and BCBS NC will reimburse the Model Practice for care 
delivered. The total medical expenses of the patients will be compared to a control group 
of patients to determine whether medical expense savings are payable to the Model 
Practice in addition to the fee-for-service payments. The providers at the Model Practice 
will be salaried and eligible for a bonus incentive based on clinical quality metrics. 
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The specific details surrounding medical expense savings are currently under 
discussion. However, one fundamental principle is protection of the Model Practice 
providers against catastrophic patients to ensure that the practice is not unfairly penalized 
for a catastrophic case. 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina (BCBS NC) and the 
University of North Carolina Health Care System (UNCHCS) 
Provider Participation • Model Practice, a primary care practice, is capitalized through 
a newly created LLC formed by BCBS NC and UNCHCS 
• Model Practice will employ a care team approach to include, 
but not be limited to, nutritionists, mental health providers, and 
pharmacists 
• Relationships with area specialists for enhanced and 
coordinated care delivery 
Status as of May 2011 A signed letter of agreement is in place, and the practice plans to 
open in late 2011 with three-year agreements for the providers 
Geographic Reach Approximate 25-mile radius of the Model Practice including 
Durham County, Orange County, and Wake County, North Carolina 
Market Share Approximately 5,000 chronically ill members will participate—a 
small percentage of the over one million people in the Research 
Triangle area  
Products PPO  
Payment 
Payment Summary Initial start-up capital jointly funded by BCBS NC and UNCHCS; 
ongoing operating budget funded by FFS payments from BCBS 
NC for care the Model Practice delivers with an outcomes-based 
quality and medical expense savings payment arrangement in 
development 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility  
The Model Practice will bill and be paid by BCBS NC on a FFS 
basis for care it delivers. Providers will be salaried and eligible for 
a bonus incentive based on clinical quality metrics. 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Primary care with a focus on chronic conditions and chronic care 
for asthma, cardiac disease, congestive heart failure, 
hypertension, and hyperlipidemia, among others 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Access; preventive care; chronic care process and health 
outcomes; acute care process and health outcomes; total 
medical expense savings; member education and self-directed 
care; patient safety; patient experience 
Efficiency  Efficiency/utilization 
Implementation 
Provider Support The Model Practice and providers will receive regular feedback 
regarding any appropriate metrics as they are available; 
assistance with information regarding transitions in care; 
notifications and data of member treatments by other facilities 
and organizations; in-depth member health data sharing; and 
advanced technology such as an online system for patients to 
make appointments, receive information, and communicate with 
the practice 
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Performance Measurement 
Performance on clinical metrics will be a bonus arrangement with the Model Practice 
providers. BCBS NC and UNCHCS plan to rely on existing standard and nationally 
endorsed measures, so the practice may be analyzed against a proxy group. The clinical 
informatics staff for each organization is examining the most appropriate proxy. 
 
Defining Characteristics 
In designing the Model Practice, BCBS NC and UNCHCS describe several essential 
characteristics they expect will set the practice apart. An online registration and 
communications system will allow patients to schedule appointments online and provide 
access to their detailed medical information. This innovative feature offers increased 
patient access and control, and adds to efficiencies in the administrative process for the 
practice. The practice will also conduct previsit analyses in advance of patient visits, 
making providers more prepared to answer potential questions and provide clinical 
decisions in a timely manner. Providers within the practice will receive intensive data for 
real-time analyses of their care and clinical effectiveness. 
 
6. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
As part of a broader strategy to address quality and affordability issues in innovative 
ways, Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey (BCBS NJ) created a wholly 
owned subsidiary called Horizon Healthcare Innovations (HHI), LLC. Horizon 
Healthcare Innovations pursues new reimbursement and care delivery models with the 
ultimate goal of reducing waste in health care spending and reducing the total cost of 
care. ACO Pilot, a product of HHI, has as its specific goals improving quality and 
reducing the cost of care. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
The ACO Pilot comprises a large multispecialty group and several of Horizon BCBS NJ’s 
national accounts are participating as purchasers. The multispecialty group includes 
primary care, specialty care, ancillary services, and some ambulatory and surgery 
services. The Pilot interacts with its choice of hospitals; these hospitals are not 
contractually included in the Pilot, but their costs are included in the Pilot’s total cost of 
care calculations. 
 
Participation in the Pilot is restricted to 1,000 to 2,000 patients with commercial 
self-insured PPO coverage. Retrospectively, HHI attributes patients to the Pilot based on 
a percentage of their total visits. It conducts the attribution calculation at the conclusion 
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of the Pilot, so the patients and physicians are blind to the patients’ participation. This 
arrangement places responsibility on the providers to “delight” their patients by providing 
great care and encouraging them to consider the participating multispecialty group as 
their sole source of care. 
 
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey 
Provider Participation Large, multispecialty medical group; the identity of the medical 
group was not disclosed 
Status as of May 2011 Pilot launched with two-year contract during the 4th quarter of 
2010  
Geographic Reach North of Atlantic City, New Jersey 
Market Share Pilot is limited to 1,000 to 2,000 patients  
Products Pilot is available to commercial self-insured PPO patients 
Payment 
Payment Summary Base payment is fee-for-service with shared savings and shared 
losses 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility 
Providers must spend equal or less than the projected total cost 
of care, or they risk losing up to a double-digit percentage of their 
fee schedule in future years. If providers spend less than the 
projected total cost of care and they meet a quality threshold, 
they are eligible to receive up to a prenegotiated percentage of 
the savings generated  
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Access; patient experience; preventive care; chronic care 
processes of care; chronic care outcomes; efficiency/utilization of 
care; patient safety; population health 
Efficiency  Total cost of care 
Implementation 
Provider Support Types of support: ongoing dialogue, collaboration and meetings 
focusing on key metrics; care coordination support; informatics; 
monthly meetings with lead executives from participating 
accounts.  
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
The ACO Pilot accounts for upside and downside payment risk. HHI provides the Pilot 
with a base fee schedule aligned against a projected total cost of care. If the Pilot exceeds 
the projected total cost of care, it is responsible for reimbursing HHI and the participating 
accounts a prenegotiated percentage of the excess costs. HHI did not disclose the exact 
percentage that must be returned, but noted it is in the double digits. To protect the 
providers, the total cost of care is risk-adjusted, and a mechanism is in place to eliminate 
outliers that may skew results for the population. The amount of money at risk is also 
capped, so even if the Pilot must reimburse HHI and national accounts for excess costs, it 
is guaranteed a baseline of revenue. 
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If the Pilot is able to provide care at a reduced cost while meeting a quality 
threshold, it is eligible to share in the savings achieved (the delta between the projected 
costs and actual costs). The savings are shared between the participating accounts, HHI, 
and the Pilot; the Pilot’s percentage of the savings share is set at a prenegotiated amount. 
The Pilot is also eligible for additional payment if it performs within the top 10 percent of 
all the quality metrics. 
 
Performance Measurement 
To share in any savings achieved, the ACO Pilot must meet a quality threshold. This 
threshold comprises HEDIS measures addressing diabetes care, cardiovascular care, 
oncology treatment, BMI assessment, and numerous quality domains. The variety of 
measures is intended to be wide ranging, but not so broad that performance (or lack of 
performance) in one measure dilutes the impact of the others. 
 
Annually, HHI’s internal analytics team will measure the Pilot’s performance in a 
straightforward, retrospective evaluation. As agreed on in the Pilot contract, a third party 
will also validate the evaluation. 
 
Looking Forward 
The ACO Pilot reports early indications of success, primarily concerning improvements 
in total cost of care. HHI attributes this success to the Pilot’s structure, and its impact on 
the providers’ view of management and approach to care. HHI has not speculated on the 
Pilot’s performance on quality improvement metrics, but the findings will impact HHI’s 
decisions on how to move forward. Specifically, the Pilot’s performance on quality 
metrics will determine if it will be scaled and replicated, or adjusted and improved. 
 
As HHI awaits the findings from the Pilot’s first annual performance evaluation, 
it has begun focusing on consumer engagement. HHI recognizes a lack of patient 
knowledge concerning patient-centered medical homes and ACOs and intends to focus 
on consumer engagement in the coming months to help patients understand the benefits 
of being involved in an ACO. 
 
7. Medica Health Plan5 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
Medica’s alternative payment model stems from discussions among leadership regarding 
escalating provider payment rates and the need for aligned incentives to reduce costs. 
                                                
5 The summary for Medica Health Plan was also informed by an interview with Fairview Health 
System, a contracted provider participating in the shared-risk arrangement. 
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These discussions were the genesis of Medica’s Total Cost of Care contracts, which were 
conceived as a long-term yet evolving payment model, as opposed to a pilot. Each of the 
six Total Cost of Care contracts is unique in its exact payment methodology, but follows 
a similar structure that includes shared savings and some amount of revenue at risk based 
on performance. Medica also aims to encourage delivery system changes with 
participating providers, such as less frequent use of the emergency department (ED) and 
increased coordination of care after a hospital or ED discharge. 
 
Medica Health Plan at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser Medica Health Plan 
Provider Participation • Five integrated health systems: Allina, Fairview Health 
System, Health East, North Memorial, Park Nicollet 
• One physician clinic: North Clinic 
Status as of May 2011 Launched in July 2008 
Geographic Reach Minnesota Twin Cities region 
Market Share 30 percent of commercial market 
Products Commercial PPO and POS products; recently expanded to 
Medicaid product 
Payment 
Payment Summary Shared savings with either a withhold arrangement or 
prospective adjustments to FFS payments in which providers are 
eligible for withheld funds when they achieve the performance 
threshold (cost and quality); with the withhold, if providers do not 
achieve performance thresholds, they must return a portion of 
their payments 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility 
Providers must meet PMPM cost targets in comparison to a peer 
group to be eligible; provider performance is compared on an 
acuity-adjusted PMPM basis. If providers attain savings 
compared to the peer group, they are eligible for up to 50 percent 
of the savings they generate. Providers must also meet 
performance benchmarks on specified quality measures to be 
eligible for a share in savings or earn the amount withheld 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care with the exception of behavioral health 
and dental services 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Preventive care; chronic care processes of care; chronic care 
outcomes; efficiency and utilization of care 
Efficiency  PMPM risk-adjusted costs 
Implementation 
Provider Support Types of support: performance data feedback; clinical advisory 
support; patient cost data; and supplemental health coaching  
(as needed) 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
There are currently six providers—five integrated health systems and one physician 
clinic—participating in Medica’s Total Cost of Care contracts. These providers are 
located in Minnesota’s Twin Cities region, and Medica is anticipating expansion to other 
parts of Minnesota (e.g., Duluth and St. Cloud) and North Dakota. 
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Medica retrospectively assigns patients to a primary care provider based on 
claims history. Initially, patients could be assigned to hospitalists, rather than primary 
care physicians, based on their admission to a hospital. Medica has recently improved the 
method of attribution so that it now assigns all patients to a primary care provider in an 
outpatient setting. 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
The Total Cost of Care contracts entail a “risk and reward pool” funded through a 
withheld amount (which is held either by Medica or by the provider) or through 
prospective adjustments to providers’ FFS payment schedule. A given amount is withheld 
at the beginning of the contract year, and providers must achieve an established cost and 
quality threshold in order to receive payment from the withheld amount. Cost 
performance (80%) and quality performance (20%) determine eligibility for some of or 
the entire withheld amount. Between 2 percent and 8 percent of provider revenue is at 
risk under these arrangements. Providers are also eligible for additional payment based 
on savings they achieve; specifically, providers are eligible to keep up to 50 percent of 
any savings they earn. 
 
Performance Measurement 
The quality metrics used to determine performance include the Minnesota Community 
Measurement program and include measures of preventive care, chronic care, and 
utilization. Medica establishes targets for select procedures (e.g., reduction in ED visits, 
reduction in elective labor inductions) and works with the providers to establish other 
thresholds for improvement. Medica also assesses efficiency by measuring the overall, 
risk-adjusted PMPM cost. Performance on the various metrics is assessed annually for 
payment adjustments; however, providers receive feedback at least quarterly from 
Medica regarding their performance. Medica also gives the providers a “prospective risk-
adjustment perspective” so the providers can understand which of their patients is high 
cost and manage patient care more efficiently. 
 
Successes and Considerations Moving Forward 
Since 2008, a number of successes and lessons learned have allowed Medica to improve 
the cost trend and offer its provider partners a more data-rich environment. Medica has 
seen lower FFS rate increases as a result of their Total Cost of Care contracts, and they 
have recently initiated similar contracts that involve the Medicaid population. There have 
been challenges with the withhold method of payment, including a concern that the 
withhold model does not adequately support Medica’s goal to eliminate overuse. In some 
cases, Medica has found providers deliver more care under FFS systems with large 
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withhold arrangements. There is also an administrative burden associated with processing 
individual checks to self-funded groups in situations when providers earn only a portion 
of the withhold. As an alternative to the withhold method and as a means of funding the 
risk and reward pool, Medica is exploring a PMPM fee (similar to a medical home 
payment) that could be increased or decreased based on the provider’s cost and quality 
performance. Another alternative could include a network management fee that would be 
assessed as part of the premium. 
 
8. State of Maine/MaineGeneral Health Collaboration 
Goals Associated with the Payment Model 
The overall goal of the collaboration between the Maine State Employees Health 
Commission (SEHC) and MaineGeneral Health is to improve patient care by aligning 
payment to quality and efficiency of care. The collaboration is unique and is the most 
mature of several similar pilots under way in Maine. These pilots are collaborations 
convened by the Maine Health Management Coalition (MHMC) and bring together 
providers, payers, and consumers to consider ways to align structures and incentives for 
higher quality and coordinated care. MHMC has led public reporting efforts in Maine and 
the SEHC uses this publicly reported data as the basis for a tiering structure that creates 
incentives for patients to choose higher-tier providers. The collaboration between 
MaineGeneral and the SEHC began when the SEHC challenged MaineGeneral to come 
up with an innovative approach to make strides in advancing quality and reducing cost; if 
successful, SEHC would place MaineGeneral in a tier of its own. The innovative 
approach under development includes both a change in care delivery and the use of 
payment models to support it. Payers have been invited to participate; to date, they have 
not become involved. Rather, the SEHC and MaineGeneral are engaging in direct 
contracting arrangements to support the new payment model. 
 
Provider and Patient Participation 
All providers within the MaineGeneral system are participating. This includes one 
hospital (on two campuses), 116 primary care providers in 26 practices, and 112 
specialists. MaineGeneral is working with its various primary care practices to enhance 
their ability to provide well-coordinated care; the philosophy behind the initiative is that 
primary care is the foundation for success. The 26 primary care practices are in various 
stages of preparedness and range in ability to provide this foundation. Five of the 26 are 
designated as patient-centered medical homes. MaineGeneral has established a Primary 
Care Transformation Committee to address needs around care management, 
administrative support, and support in use of health IT. 
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Participation in the initiative is open to all SEHC employees and their dependents 
in the market; MaineGeneral is also opening the initiative to the approximately 4,400 
individuals in its self-insured population. Currently, SEHC has approximately 8,000 of its 
insured population (excluding retirees) in a MaineGeneral primary care practice, which 
represents approximately 26 percent of its membership statewide. 
 
State of Maine/MaineGeneral Health Collaboration at a Glance 
General Information 
Payer/Purchaser State Employees Health Commission (SEHC) 
Provider Participation MaineGeneral Health 
Status as of May 2011 Implementation began February 2010  
Geographic Reach Central Maine 
Market Share Covered lives equal approximately 5 percent of MaineGeneral 
market share  
Products Not applicable; direct contract between SEHC and MaineGeneral 
Payment 
Payment Summary Currently paid FFS with risk-sharing based on performance on 
quality/efficiency metrics. Negotiations under way to move to 
partial capitation; also considering shared savings model as step 
toward partial capitation 
Payment Mechanism and 
Eligibility  
MaineGeneral is paid FFS with up to $250,000 at risk based on 
achievement of quality/efficiency metrics 
Measurement 
Specific Conditions 
Addressed 
Full continuum of care 
Quality Improvement 
Domains 
Access; patient engagement; patient experience; clinical quality 
Efficiency  Utilization and financial metrics 
Implementation 
Provider Support MaineGeneral is supporting its primary care practices in various 
ways, depending on need. Examples include care management 
support, health IT, and administrative support 
 
Payment and Risk-Sharing Arrangement 
The initiative launched in early 2010 with downside risk: MaineGeneral will continue to 
be paid FFS and a separate pool of funds has been set aside from which MaineGeneral 
may be required to pay SEHC up to $250,000 based on whether it achieves specific 
quality targets on five domains of measurement, detailed below. SEHC and 
MaineGeneral describe this first step as “symbolic” in the progression toward more 
robust shared risk. Active negotiations are under way to implement a five-year plan to 
move from the downside risk of the first year to some type of partial capitation. They 
may implement a shared savings model as part of this progression; however, both entities 
have discussed that shared savings may not be enough to support coordinated, high-
quality, efficient care. 
 
To align incentives across stakeholders, SEHC is also considering implementing 
financial incentives for enrollees to participate in the MaineGeneral network. 
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Performance Measurement 
In the first year, measurement is based on five domains of performance: access, patient 
engagement, clinical quality, utilization, and financials, and incorporates performance 
measurement initiatives under way under the leadership of the Maine Health 
Management Coalition. The access metric is focused on expanding primary care 
workforce capacity. Patient engagement includes achievement of MHMC “Blue Ribbon” 
status based on MaineGeneral’s performance on the Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey. For full achievement of the patient 
engagement metric, MaineGeneral must also develop Patient Advisory Councils at all 
five of its patient-centered medical home practices. The clinical quality domain relies on 
MHMC measures of care for heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical 
infection. Utilization is measured by reduction in nonurgent emergency room visits as 
compared to the previous years; the financial domain metric requires MaineGeneral to 
maintain current cost trends (with an increase of no more than 5%) for the SEHC 
population over the year. 
 
Looking Ahead 
As noted above, the initiative as currently deployed is the first step of a five-year plan. 
Many details of the future payment model, including performance measurement and 
incentive structure, are under development. Although initially conceived as a pilot, both 
SEHC and MaineGeneral are committed to this collaboration as a mechanism to create 
permanent change in care delivery and payment. In addition, discussions are under way 
to include additional purchasers in the arrangement. One limitation to developing a robust 
risk-sharing arrangement is the need for better data and financial modeling. Without the 
involvement of payers—or access to their data and actuarial analyses—SEHC and 
MaineGeneral lack easy access to some of the building blocks of a truly sophisticated 
risk-sharing arrangement. This model, and the collaborative process through which it is 
being developed, is becoming a model for others throughout the state. MHMC is helping 
convene several other pilots throughout Maine that are developing similar models. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the flurry of activity to understand and establish ACOs since the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act, the development of ACOs and the payment models to support them 
are still their infancy. While some provider groups are well positioned and already deliver 
coordinated care across the care continuum, it is too early to know whether independent 
providers can or will reorganize themselves to deliver coordinated care. Moreover, there 
are many unknowns about the requisites for success and the payment models that will 
most appropriately align incentives while providing burgeoning ACOs with the resources 
to manage their patients successfully. 
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Throughout the industry there is interest in population-based shared-risk contracts 
as a way to help align incentives for high-quality and coordinated care. The proposed rule 
for the Medicare Shared Savings Program creates incentives for providers forming ACOs 
to move quickly toward accepting financial risk. Taking on financial risk for a patient 
population has the potential to provide stronger incentives for providers to coordinate and 
streamline care delivery than other payment models, such as shared savings. However, 
very few payment models exist today that can provide evidence-based guidance on 
program design or evidence of the impact of shared-risk arrangements. 
 
This lack of experience also leaves unknowns about what providers need to be 
successful under shared-risk arrangements. One element highlighted through this research 
is providers’ need for more data and analytic capabilities to aid both in their management 
of the patient population for which they take on financial risk and in their negotiation of 
appropriate risk-sharing arrangements with payers. Although the payers we interviewed 
had typically introduced elements of support for providers, the limited experience with 
risk-sharing models and the developmental stage of many of the initiatives causes them to 
fall short of offering an understanding of what providers need to be successful. However, 
it is likely that concerted partnership between payers and developing ACOs will be an 
important element of success. The types of support providers need as they organize into 
and begin operating as ACOs is an area for further study. 
 
At this early stage of development, there is not a single, “one size fits all” 
approach to shared-risk contracts; the approaches are unique to each payer. On the other 
hand, many of the design concepts align to the approach to shared risk that CMS outlines 
in its proposed rule: to impose a financial penalty if spending exceeds the threshold. The 
initiatives we studied implement this financial penalty as reimbursement from the 
provider for some portion of excessive cost (e.g., Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New 
Jersey/Horizon Healthcare Innovations; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts AQC) 
or as reductions in future pricing (e.g., the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois and 
Advocate Healthcare partnership). However, shared risk can be more robust than 
imposing a financial penalty for exceeding a cost target; capitation, bundled payments, 
and global budgets place the responsibility for managing financial risk more squarely  
on the shoulders of providers. None of these initiatives employs these financial penalties 
or addresses the full array of services, even as they attempt to put in place meaningful 
quality incentives. But some of them, including Anthem/WellPoint and the 
SEHC/MaineGeneral collaboration, anticipate including these more aggressive shared-
risk payment models in the future. 
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The varying approaches to shared risk create both opportunities and challenges as 
the health care system continues to seek payment and care delivery models that promote 
high-quality, high-value care. Many unknowns persist about payment models that will 
most appropriately align incentives for high-value care. In the meantime, however, 
providers will potentially face many different signals and incentives from the various 
public and private payers with whom they do business. Providers’ attempts to respond to 
these different incentives may confuse or dilute the results and are an important area to 
monitor over time. 
 
Regardless, this research helps to familiarize us with an important component of 
today’s landscape of health care delivery and payment reform. The findings from the 
developing initiatives we studied—and others that may also exist—will inform our 
collective understanding of which approaches are most successful. The research also 
identifies for us a series of experiments to monitor and learn from over time. Through the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, there might even be opportunities to build 
on these experiments with public–private partnerships, strengthening the power of the 
pilots and making it potentially easier to detect their impact. It is unlikely that there will 
ultimately be a one size fits all solution; it will be important to learn which models work 
best in which situations. 
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Appendix A. Interviewee Organizations and Contacts 
 
No. 
 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
 
Individual(s) Interviewed 
1 Aetna Payer Elizabeth Curran 
Director, National Contracting 
Policy 
2 Anthem/WellPoint Payer Rome ("Skip") Walker, M.D. 
Medical Director 
3 Buyers Health Care Action 
Group (BHCAG) 
Purchaser 
coalition 
Ann Robinow 
Former Executive Director, Care 
Systems and Finance, BHCAG 
4 Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Illinois 
Payer Steve Hamman 
Vice President, Network 
Management 
5 Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts 
Payer Dana Safran, Sc.D. 
Senior Vice President, 
Performance Measurement and 
Improvement 
6 Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Minnesota 
Payer James W. Eppel, Jr. 
Senior Vice President, 
Commercial Markets and Health 
Management 
7 Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
North Carolina 
Payer Troy Arnold, M.B.A., M.H.A. 
Strategic Advisor, Strategic 
Development 
Don Bradley, M.D., Chief 
Medical Officer and Senior Vice 
President, Health Care 
8 Fairview Health Services* Integrated health 
system 
R. Andrew McCoy 
Vice President, Revenue 
Management 
9 Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of New Jersey 
Payer Richard Popiel, M.D., M.B.A. 
President and Chief Operating 
Officer of Horizon Healthcare 
Innovations 
10 Integrated Healthcare 
Association 
Nonprofit 
leadership group 
Dolores Yanigahara, M.P.H. 
Director, Pay for Performance 
Program 
11 Medica Payer Mike Lenz 
Vice President of Health 
Management Finance and 
Provider Strategy 
12 PreferredOne Payer Darcee Weber 
Vice President, Network 
Management 
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No. 
 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
 
Individual(s) Interviewed 
13 State of Maine/MaineGeneral 
Health Collaboration 
Payer/purchaser Elizabeth Mitchell, 
Chief Executive Officer, Maine 
Health Management Coalition 
Barbara Crowley, M.D. 
Executive Vice President, 
MaineGeneral Health 
Frank Johnson 
Executive Director, Office of 
Employee Health & Benefits, 
State of Maine 
14 State of Minnesota State 
Employee Insurance Program 
Payer/purchaser Nathan Morroco 
Director, State Employee Group 
Insurance Program 
15 ThedaCare** Integrated health 
system 
Jeff Squier 
Executive Director, Northeast 
Wisconsin Health Value Network 
16 United Healthcare Payer Sam Ho, M.D. 
Executive Vice President and 
Chief Medical Officer 
* Fairview Health Services was interviewed to gain an increased understanding of their payer–provider 
arrangements to the extent it involved risk-sharing. 
** ThedaCare was interviewed to gain an increased understanding of their payer–provider arrangements to 
the extent it involved risk-sharing. 
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Appendix B. Additional Sources Used to Inform This Report 
 
“Achieving Better Care at Lower Costs Through Accountable Care Organizations.” Public forum 
sponsored by the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform and the Dartmouth Institute for 
Health Policy and Clinical Practice, Feb. 1, 2011, Washington, D.C. 
 
“Proposed Rule on Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations,” 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, released March 31, 2011. 
 
M. E. Chernew, R. E. Mechanic, B. E. Landon et al., “Private-Payer Innovation in Massachusetts: 
The ‘Alternative Quality Contract,’” Health Affairs, Jan. 2011 30(1):51–61. 
 
E. C. Schneider, P. S. Hussey, and C. Schnyer, “Payment Reform: Analysis of Models and 
Performance Measurement Implications.” Study conducted by RAND Health and sponsored by 
the National Quality Forum, Feb. 22, 2011. 
 
